Therefore it is clear that there are at least two factors that affect decision making : the uncertainty of obtaining a particular event and the relative importance of the outcome of the event, which are both subjective, psychological entity. The former may quite well be represented by another relevant notion, subjective probability, a fractional measure taking a value between one and zero ; the value one means the absolute certainty that the event will obtain, zero the absolute certainty that it will not obtain, and, generally, subjective probability x means that the subjective odds of obtaining and not obtaining the event is x : 1-x. The latter entity, the relative importance of the outcome of an event, was called utility by von Neumann and Morgenstern, although utility is an economic notion traditionally defined for quantities of commodities. This extension of definition from commodity space to event space inevitably follows from the widening of the behavioral scientists ' scope from the pure consumers' behavior to the general decision making mechanism. It shculd be noticed, however, that the event here mentioned is not the event in general but is the event considered in relation to a particular person, since utility is a subjective value.
There is no impersonal utility, although event could be considered impersonally.
Therefore, the author prefers defining utility over state space instead of event space, since a person's state will be changed to another particular one when a particular event occurs to him. Assuming that there is a general hierarchy of desirability among all the possible future states of a person, utility is defined as a real number measure of this desirability leaving the freedom of taking arbitrarily its origin and unit.* In terms of subjective probability and utility, the foregoing examples tell us that utilities affect decision making, if the associated subjective probabilities are great ; if not, they are ineffective except the cases in which utilities have extreme values among alternatives.
These considerations lead us to the following revised von Neumann and Morgenstern postulate** as the simplest general formulation of decision-making compatible with the foregoing discussion :
Decision is so made as to choose among alternatives the act that maximizes subjectively expected utility Pij Uij, where ij denotes the j th ij alternative outcome*** when act i is chosen, Uij the utility of ij, and .Pij the subjective probability of obtaining ij when i is chosen.
Although much doubt could be raised against this postulate, what are most necessary to advance our knowledge in this field are empirically established facts; for this purpose, we first need refined concepts or quantities of which measurements are to he attempted. Since this postulate is the simplest one likely having no apparent contradiction with our daily observation, it should be regarded as the best starting point of experimental ivestigation. Even though the investigation might lead us to the rejection of the postulate, it means a progress one step forward.
On the other hand, measurement necessitates the operational definitions of what are measured.
Although this postulate could as well be regarded as the definition of utility and subjective probability, the definition is only partial; it does not enable us by itself to measure them even in principle. For the definition to be complete, some additional postulate must be added to it.
What is most bewildering here is that there is no obvious direction in which the definition is to be extended.
The gambling method, the most popular way of measuring utility, has its implicit, unfounded assumptions other than the basic postulate, about which the author discussed elsewhere (14, 16). The author's method, the game method, most fit for the purpose of measuring various changing aspects of subjective probability, also has its characteristic Suppose a player playing a game composed of many trials, on each of which he gets a score, about which he is more or less uncertain. It is usually true that as a play approaches to its end he gets more and more certain about his eventual total score; that is, saying conversely, he is more and more uncertain as the trial under concern is remote from the end.
Suppose, for the sake of simplicity, there are only two kinds of utility payoff at the end ; utility of winning and utility of losing : he wins if his total score is more than a fixed value T, and loses if not. Applying the above stated assumption, we shall assume that on a particular trial i he is considerably uncertain about his eventual total score, and also, for the sake of simplicity, that this uncertainty is represented by a homogeneous distribution of subjective proba- Therefore, as far as either one of the minimax strategy and the Bayes strategy is used by S, one tenth of the mean x can well be regarded as a fairly good estimate of the mean value of the subjective probabilities of Ss, excepting those who used other strategies than these two and those who failed to understand the rules of the game. The x's produced by those Ss could be regarded as a random noise, and would give the mean subjective probability a slight centrality bias, i. e., a bias directed toward 5.** A peculiar merit that this game has in contrast to both of the guessing method*** and the gambling method should be noted : the player X's role in this game is principally defensive ; he can play almost no "gambling." Any unreasonably great deviation of x from 10 Px will immediately give Y the chance to take advantage of the deviation. Therefore X has to be conservative whether he is winning or losing, and to be conservative means in this game to choose 10Px as x. In turn this very nature of the game depresses the long-shooting behavior of loser as a desperate effort toward winning, thus giving the mean x a considerable validity even on the ending trials.
This immunity from the intervention of the so-called gambling utility is just what is lacking in the other methods. Now that the first task of how to measure subjective probability is solved, the next task is to find the most important problems about subjective probability to which the method is first to be applied. Traditionally, this priority has been given to the calibration of subjective probability against objective probability. But this * The detailed description and analysis of the experimental games useful for such a purpose will be found in other papers of the same author (11,16). ** The minimax-regret strategy indicates to respond always x=5. *** See Toda and Ota (17).
course of investigation seems misleading. "Objective probability" here meant is the value that told by E to S as the true probability.
Although this kind of experiment might reveal that the measured subjective probability differs from the corresponding objective probability, this difference should not solely be ascribed to the individual S's transformation characteristics of objective probability to subjective probability ; but it should be taken into account that the difference could also depends on his own concept about objective probability and on the amount of his trust in E's words. Therefore, the absolute calibration of subjective probability against objective probability would probably be meaningless, since these latter two factors are very difficult to be controlled.
Another popular subject about subjective probability is usually referred to as "probability learning." Its typical experimental set-up is a very familiar one in probability theory : an urn containing N balls, of which pN are white and (l-p)N are black. From the urn balls are randomly drawn one by one ; after each draw the color of the ball drawn is observed and then the ball is returned to the urn. Before each draw the observer's subjective probability that the next ball is white is measured ; the successive values of subjective probability form a curve called the probability learning curve.* In this type of experiment, objective probability is not explicitly given, but is given implicitly through the observer's past observations. As the experiment first to be attempted about subjective probability the probability learning experiment is more preferable to the absolute calibration experiment by the following reasons : First, the former does not presuppose S's having a correct notion about objective probability ; secondly, it may be more easy to believe the fairness of an urn than E's words ; Finally and most importantly, the design of the former is more close to our daily experience by which our subjective probabilities are made up as they are, meanwhile we are seldom told about objective probabilities.
There are, however, two things that should particularly be noted as to this probability learning experiment : First, the term "probability learning" is inadequate.
Although probability theory guarantees that the frequency ratio of white balls drawn from the above described urn converges to p with probability one after infinite number of observations, the same ratio will not always be held within finite sequences ; and it is simply true that we can observe only finite sequences.
Therefore we can never learn objective probability, since it is never known exactly, unless we are permitted to count the exact numbers of the two kinds of balls in the urn. Thus probability is to be inferred, not only subjectively, but objectively also. And the sequence of subjective probabilities is to be compared not with the fixed objective probability, but with the sequence of probabilities objectively inferred from the preceding observations. There are, however, many ways of inferences which are equally objective. The most popular one is to take as the inferred probability the frequency given by past observations : Let N be the total number of past observations, out of which n was white, then the * The term "probability learning" was used by Jarvik (7).
But since he used guessing method, the first experiment conducted strictly in the way here described might he the author's (12). inferred probability that the next ball is white is n1 IV. This measure is not quite adequate with which subjective probability is compared, because subjective probability exists even in the case that no past observation was made, when the frequency measure gives no definite value. Also, when only one observation was made, the frequency is either one or zero, while subjective probability will take a more moderate value.
Another alternative of objectively inferred probability is
given by the Laplace's First Rule of Succession, i. e., n+1/N+2. N being zero, it is 1/2; N being one, it is either 2/3 or 1/3.
Thus this measure is more adequate for the purpose of comparison. It is well known that this measure is given by the Bayes theorem when the a priori objective probability is assumed to have a homogeneous distribution over CO, 1 ; that is, every value of objective probability is considered as equally probable when no observation has been made.
The empirical counterpart of this mathematical notion of a priori distribution, if it should have any, is the subjective probability distribution when the urn is presented before S and no observation is made yet. This pre-experimental subjective degree of belief, however, is one of the most difficult factors to be experimentally controlled ; it can never be assumed to have a homogeneous distribution without an evidence. It is easily seen that every member of this family converges to the same value when IV becomes large. And even on the earlier trials, every curve produced by the members with not quite large a and shares a quite similar pattern differing only in the starting point and in the general slope.
Therefore the comparison of subjective inference with objective inference represented by this two-parameter family amounts to testing whether the former shares the same general pattern of the latter. Several experiments have been conducted for this purpose, obtaining generally positive answer, which will be reported elsewhere. Now we shall proceed to the second problematic point about "probability inference" experimeTt.
We have already mentioned that 'probability inference" experiment is more close than absolute calibration experiment to the actual subjective probability formation process. However, it is still unrealistic in the respect that it uses a fair urn. It is seldom true in our experience that the observed sequence of events is an entirely random sequence such as those produced from a fair urn.
Instead, it is quite often true that the sequence involves sequential dependencies. Moreover, it is never possible to determine from a finite segment of a sequence whether or not there are sequential dependencies, as long as the necessary knowledge about the mechanism producing the sequence is lacking.
The objective way of inference common in such a case is to analyse the finite sample sequence as a Markov process.
A sequence is called an nth order Markov process if the probability of each event depends just n preceding events.
In On each trial after the card was opened, E recorded on a blackboard the outcome of the card. Thus every S could see the sequence of symbols appeared up to the trial. This procedure was used to enable the direct comparison of the subjective inference with the objective inference, since objective inference is made with the complete knowledge of the preceding sequence of symbols.
Even with this advantage, it must have been virtually impossible for Ss to try any mathematical calculation within such a fairly short inter-trial interval as about twenty seconds in average during which they had to do everything required in the play. ti ;10 and is called the manifest subjective probability. The sequence of the mean manifest subjective probabilities of Groups I and II are shown in Fig. 1 , where the trials are numbered from 0 to 90. It is remarkable that the curves are both not quite smooth but exhibiting many up-and-downs which must reflect the non-randomness of the symbol sequences, since the curves are much more smooth when the symbol sequences are entirely random.
It see that there is small possibility that a given curve incidentally shows a good agreement with one of the curves belonging to this family. Inspection of Fig. 2 will obviously reveal that the smooth 0 th order curve, which is virtually identical with the relative frequency curve except the first several trials, exhibits no similarity at all with the Group I curve except the general increasing trend.
On the first order curve, upand-downs first appear which are yet quite different from those appearing on the subjective curve. Beginning with the second, these up-and-downs become to exhibit some similarity. At the fourth, the resemblance becomes maximal over the trials 0 th through 38 th, although the amplitudes of the up-and-downs are a little greater than those of the subjective curve. After the 39th trial the similarity becomes further marked as the Markovian order grows up, the highest similarity being attained at the fifth and the sixth, and at the seventh the similarity again becomes to lose. By and large the fourth and the fifth order Markov curves show the best fit to the subjective curve through the whole 58 trials, though with a little greater amplitude. This excess amplitude depends, however, on our arbitrary selection of 2 and 1 for a and j3 respectively. Therefore, to show this striking similarity more clearly, these two Markov curves are plotted in Fig. 3 with a=4 and /3=2 together with the curve of Group I and that of Group II turned upside down.
The intuitive impression of striking similarity is confirmed by the author's test. for the goodness of fit of theoretical values to observed values (13), which shows that, even for the curves with a=2 and (3=1, the probability that such a small absolute total difference between the subjective and the objective curves occurs by chance is far below the ordinary levels of significance.
Thus, it is doubtless that subjective inference is made, on the average, 0.5 on trials 62 through 60+n and smaller than that afterwards. The striking similarity between the objective and the subjective inferences observed before the 61st trial is thus lost after the 62nd trial. This breakdown may be interpreted in this way : Since 0-card never appeared twice in succession before the 61st trial, there never appears the same Markovian state before and after the 61st trial, as long as we are dealing with the second or higher order Markov process. Therefore, if one wished to adhere to the second or higher order Markovian inference, he has to give up to utilize all the knowledge he obtains before the 61st trial and to start entirely anew on the 62 nd trial.
Then the sudden disappearance of similarity between objective and subjective inferences occurred on the 62nd trial seems to mean that Ss hesitated to abandon thoroughly the previous knowledge ; the previous knowledge might supported by the result as shown in Fig. 5 . The evidence is too poor to be conclusive, however.
Therefore, let us turn to examine not only the mean values of subjective probabilities but also the distributions of them around these trials at issue. Before the 61st trial, the distributions are mostly of fairly simple forms (only a few samples are plotted in Fig. 6) ; there would not be much objection if they are regarded as sample distributions of populations belonging to the same family, e. g., the Beta distribution family. The test of goodness of fit cannot be applied because of too few samples.)
Something strange appears, however, on trials 62 through 69. Samples falling on 0.5 are unduly many if the samples are independently drawn from the populations belonging to the same unimodal distribution family.
Instead. they look as if they are sample distributions drawn from the composite is right, the probability that a "0.5" response is made must be the same for all the Ss, and therefore, the distribution of the number of "0. These findings seem to tell us that the analysis of not only the sequence of mean subjective probability, but also the individual S's sequence of subjective probabilities is worth undertaking.
The above findings suggest that the individual S's manifest subjective probability was not produced by a strictly causal mechanism, but by a sort of random selection mechanism from a subjective probability population distribution, so to speak. It is interesting, and gives a strong support to this hypothesis of random selection mechanism, that even the most rational one among the individual curves-rational in the sense of Markovian-is less rational than the mean curve, as shown in Fig. 8 . At the same time, the difference between this most rational curve and the most irrational curve, plotted in the same figure, indicates that there are much differences among the individual population distributions.
It would be remembered, however, that it is an established fact that the mean curve is closely fit by the fourth or the fifth order Markov curve at least up to the 61st trial.
There could be only one plausible explanation of this : All the individual population distributions may differ from each other, but they do only under the restriction that, if we build up a composite distribution from all the individual distributions, its mean is close to the Markov value on every trial up to the 61st. For this being possible, it is necessary that, at least for the majority of the individual population distributions, the population mean Pi is given by Pi= QiM, where M is the Markov value and Qi an operator belonging to i th individual, being invariant throughout the trials ; Qi is characterized by a set of parameters each of which is a random variables distributing over individuals, and therefore can be regarded as representing a part of individual difference in subjective inference. Since Pi; is the population mean, the individual manifest subjective probability pi; as a sample from the population will be expressed as :
pi; =Pii+oij, E; coif) =0. These equations are general enough to describe how much and in what way each individual is influenced by the Markov way of inference ; for example, in no influence case, all A's and B are zero, leaving only C and o. Therefore the problems here arising are to know the relative degree of dominance among these elementary transformations, as being represented by the amounts of dispersions of the corresponding coefficients, and also to know the autocorrelation of 'di; for each i with respect to j. Although the thorough investigation of these problems has to be left to another experiment, since the present one was not designed specifically for that purpose, yet some information could be derived even from the present data, as will be attempted below. In order to know semethirgabout Qi from pi;, we must average pi; for each set of j characterized by the same value of M, in order to average off oij. It is difficult to decide, however, which one of the fourth and the fifth Markovians and what value of a is to be taken for M; and also it is hard to get enough number of pi; for each separate value of M Out of 29. S were significant at the 1% level, and 2 at the 5% level. These two tests are not independent, however, since, on trials 0 through 60, trials with m>0. 5 are far more than those with m<0.5. Yet for some Ss, the deviation was significant in only one of the two tests, as also shown in Fig. 13 . It would then be suspected that the transformation operators Q, of the Ss who were significant at the first test and not at the second were of the displacement type, and those of the Ss who were significant in the reverse way were of the rotational type. These are the predictions that can be tested by the later trials, and the left parts of the curves for the Ss under concern presented in Fig. 13 (Since we can regard /t,(m) as a good estimate of the corresponding pij, pij minus m(n) can also be regarded as a good estimate of d,;.) X2 test was applied to these numbers both individually and for the group as a whole.
Out of 29, only 4 were significant at the 5% level, the number being quite under the stretch of the chance occurrence.
The total Z2 was also insignificant.
Therefore The situation for Group I after the always a single value, but it fluctuates with a particular same probability distribution of existence ? If this is true the decision made according to this fluctuating subjective probability must too vascilate. It is true that our inner driving force toward each alternative decisions vascilates when we are trying to make an important decision.
But it is not true that the decision itself vascilates so incessantly even after it is made.
Although the author is rather inclined to believe in the latter alternative, it is beyond the extent of this paper to discuss this complicated topic any more.
